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P ICTURE a packed room filled with angry airline pilots,
various Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) "blue
suits," congressmen, and other interested parties. One an-
gry pilot stands to say, "Pilots should be allowed to continue
to fly. DeBakey, that heart surgeon in Houston, is about 80
years old, but no one told him that he can't operate." An
FAA administrator rises to respond,
That may be true, but the person on which Dr. DeBakey is
operating chose him to be the doctor. When people board
a plane, they have no choice about who will fly the plane.
Moreover, when your Dr. DeBakey makes a mistake, he
only kills one person. Only one family and their friends will
be affected. But when a pilot makes a mistake, he has the
potential to kill hundreds on the plane and even more on
the ground. Likewise, the ripple of people affected is over-
whelming. Your analogy is comparing apples to oranges.'
On the other hand, there was a great round of spirited ap-
plause when David R. Hinson, the head of the FAA, said,
Telephone Interview with Dan Meier, Regulatory Branch Flight Standards Serv-
ices, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 15, 1993). Mr. Meier
was quoting, to the best of his memory, a recent argument at the latest FAA hearing
on the Mandatory Age 60 Retirement Age for airline pilots.
AMADATORY RETIREMENT
"[a] s the new Administrator, I approach this issue with an
open mind."2 The applause quickly waned, however, and
silence again engulfed the room when Hinson continued
with the comment, "[t]he principal issue we have to deal
with is flight safety."3
I. THE RECENT MOVEMENT
Commercial airline pilots have risen yet another time to
challenge the FAA 1959 mandatory retirement rule for pi-
lots.4 The rule applies to commercial aircraft pilots carry-
ing more than thirty passengers or with payloads exceeding
7,500 pounds.5 Early in the history of the Age Sixty Rule, in
Holmes v. Helms,6 the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA, to
justify its denial of exemption, need only show that granting
an exemption to the rule would adversely affect safety and
thus would not be in the best interest of safety. 7 The Court
also held that the FAA need not show that the applicant is
disqualified under a specific medical regulation.8
On September 29, 1993, the FAA held a public hearing
to re-examine the Rule after releasing a new study April 8,
1993. This study found that pilots approaching age sixty
have not been involved in more accidents than pilots in
other age groups, and that accident rates have not in-
creased for commercial and private pilots between sixty and
at least sixty-three.9 The study also looked at private pilots
and other pilots who fly without age limits, however, and
2 U.S. Considers Lifting Ban on Older Pilots, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at Al, A23.
3 Id.
4 Pilots Decry Age-60 Forced Retirement in Show of Zest L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at
A24 [hereinafter "Forced Retirement"].
5 Steven Morris, Grounded at 60: Pilots Cite Experience in Renewing Fight Against FAA
Retirement, CM. TiUB., Mar. 1, 1992. 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1994) (Age Sixty Rule)
states: "(c) No certificate holder may use the services of any person as a pilot on an
airplane engaged in operations under this part if that person has reached his or her
60th birthday...." Department of Transportation, FAA, [Docket No. 23174; Notice
No. 82-10], 47 Fed. Reg. 29,782 (1982).
6 705 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1983).
7 Id. at 347.
8 Id.
9 Alan Armstrong, The FAA Has Scheduled a Meeting to Hear Comments on the Age 60
Rule in Washington, D.C., FLIGHTWATCH, vol. 30, (1993).
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found that accident rates increase in some cases after age
sixty-three.10 According to Hilton Systems, Inc., which con-
ducted the study for the FAA, "[t] his suggests that (airlines)
could cautiously increase the (mandatory) retirement age
to sixty-three."11
The challenge to the rule, though gaining momentum,
has been harshly criticized from various organizations from
its beginning. 12  Although pilots challenging the rule have
lost in U.S. courts, this new challenge has arisen out of a
belief that recent medical technology will allow pilots to be
tested for the detection of medical problems that might af-
fect their ability to fly.13 While no pilot has ever been
granted a waiver from the Age Sixty Rule, the FAA has
waived other rules by allowing pilots to fly after suffering
from heart conditions, alcohol abuse, and other potentially
disabling conditions.14
Part II of this comment examines the arguments on both
sides of the mandatory retirement rule; Part III discusses
past court challenges; Part IV studies the newest challenges;
Part V summarizes the latest FAA findings and some possi-
ble effects of projected changes in the rule; and Part VI
concludes with a prediction of the Rule's future.
10 Lester Reingold, Laying Siege to 'Age 60; Professional Pilots Federation Lobbying to
Allow Pilots Over Age 60 to Fy Commercial Routes, AIR TRAsp. WORLD, Vol. 30, June
1993, at 184. In opposition to the study, David Michaels, a professor of epidemiol-
ogy who appeared on behalf of the Allied Pilots Association and the Air Line Pilots
Association, both of which support the Age Sixty Rule, considered the study invalid
anyway because accident rates are a "very crude tool" on which to base a decision.
Arguments on FAA's Age 60 Rule Continue to Turn on Medical Evidence, AVIATION DAILY,
Sept. 30, 1993, at 501.
1 Id.
12 Robin Sidel, Pilot Retirement Rule Faces Renewed Scrutiny, REUTER ASIA-PAcIFIC
Bus. REP., Sept. 13, 1993, at 1.
13 Morris, supra note 5, at 1; Michael S. Serrill, Cockpit Gray: A Broad Ruling on Age
Bias, TiME, July 1, 1993, at 45.
14 Morris, supra note 5, at 1.
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II. HISTORY OF THE ARGUMENT
A. ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES
The Age Sixty Rule, since its inception more than thirty
years ago, has been the subject of much debate.15 Its pro-
ponents and opponents have proclaimed their arguments
publicly for years. Those arguments and justifications have
not varied substantially in form over the rule's long
existence.
1. The Initial FAA Argument for the Rule
The FAA policy goal is to promote passenger safety, while
at the same time preserving the interests of pilots. 16 The
FAA presently supports mandatory retirement at age sixty
because of safety concerns arising out of a medical study
that found that heart attacks or strokes, unable to be accu-
rately detected or predicted by medical knowledge in the
1960s, were more frequent in men approaching sixty.'
The FAA's study found that:
(1) [A]ging causes deterioration of important physical and
mental processes related to degenerative arterioscelosis
(hardening of the arteries);
(2) because each individual experiences aging differently,
predicting its effect would be impossible;
(3) during the later stages of life, age-related degeneration
accelerates; and
(4) sudden incapacitation, often disabling without warning,
results from age discrimination."i
In view of this, the FAA has argued that the increased risks
of incapacitation and error could not be entirely screened
out - even if the FAA incorporates the health protocol sug-
15 R. Michael Kasperak, Jr., Comment, Mandatory Retirement of Airline Pilots: An
Analysis of the FAA's Age 60 Retirement Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 241 (1981). The regula-
tion has changed forms several times because of these challenges. Id.
16 Reingold, supra note 10, at 184.
17 Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 898 (2d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961).
18 Kasperak, supra note 15, at 244-45.
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gested in Aman v. FAA 19 with existing operational tests -
without compromising, by some amount, the current level
of safety.20 In defense of the practice of allowing other
medically-exempt pilots to fly, 21 the FAA states these pilots
are not comparable to the older pilots as those with specific
health problems can be identified, tested, and monitored
to prevent a compromise of safety.22 For exempt pilots, the
FAA argues, a developed means of assessment exists.23
The FAA has also recently proclaimed its faithful adher-
ence to the rule because it fears accidents resulting from
health problems and slower reflexes arising out of old
age. 4 In addition, the FAA adopted the airlines' concern
that "raising the retirement age could disrupt pension
plans, flight schedules and health care plans. '' 25  And on a
technical level, the FAA fears that new jets coming into ser-
vice may be too complicated for older pilots. 26 Thus, a re-
tirement rule for older pilots could subtly address this
problem by slowly removing less technically-trained pilots,
primarily the older pilots, from the cockpit.
2. The Pilots Associations' Arguments
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), a pilots' union
representing over 42,000 unionized pilots at thirty-six air-
lines, formerly opposed the Age Sixty Rule, but now whole-
heartedly supports the rule. 7 Union spokesman John
Mayor provided three reasons for the change of sides. First,
after much evaluation, testing, and studies, he said that
"safety considerations are such that we think it is better to
19 856 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991); see infra note 90
for a further discussion of Aman.
20 Aman, 856 F.2d at 949 (quoting FAA Denial of Exemption No. 25,008, at 13
(Sept. 8, 1987)).
21 See discussion supra note 15 and accompanying text.
22 FAA Denial of Exemption, No. 25,008, at 32 (Sept. 8, 1987).
23 Id.
24 Robin Sidel, Pilot Retirement Rule Faces Renewed Scrutiny, REUTER Bus. REP., Sept.





err on the side of being conservative."28 Second, pilots rep-
resented by ALPA also fear intrusion as a higher retirement
would result in more stringent health tests with more inva-
sive procedures.2 9 Finally, the Union supports the rule be-
cause it feels "the majority of the pilots prefer to retire at
sixty." '0 Pilots against the rule accuse the Union's repre-
sentatives of having the ulterior motive of supporting the
rule to displace older pilots just to increase the mobility of
upward promotions for younger pilots. 31
3. Pilots and the Age Sixty Rule Opposition Argument
Like the arguments in favor of the Age Sixty Rule, the
rule's opposition has also existed for thirty years. Lately,
their most prominent argument has arisen out of the study
released April 8, 1993, which disclosed that airline pilots ap-
proaching age sixty have not been involved in more acci-
dents than pilots in other age groups, as previously
believed.3 2 In fact, based on data from commercial and pri-
vate pilots, studies show no increase in the accident rates
from pilots age sixty to at least age sixty-three.3 3 One re-
tired pilot, Captain David Cronin, said the airlines are "los-
ing valuable people by retiring pilots when they reach a
certain number imposed by the FAA."34 In addition, Joseph
Ritorto, head of Teterboro, New Jersey Airport Air Traffic
Committee, suggested that being sixty today is not what it
used to be when older people were less active. 35  Pilots ar-
gue that FAA regulations today require them to be in tip-
top physical shape, not the "wing-chair" image of the age
sixty in the past.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id., quoting Michael Miro, spokesman for the Allied Pilots Association, which
represents pilots at American Airlines and American Eagle.
31 Glenn Kessler, Higher Court Agrees to Clip Wings at 60; Rejects Appeal by Pilots on
Mandatory Retirement, NEWSDAY, Mar. 26, 1991, at 1.
32 Armstrong, supra note 9, at 30.
33 Id.
'4 Morris, supra note 5, at 1.
- Forced Retirement, supra note 4, at Al, A24.
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Many pilots, along with Captain Cronin, believe there
should be no mandatory retirement age but instead height-
ened physical and proficiency tests. 36 These pilots base this
belief on the premise that all pilots now are required to
take two physical exams a year as well as pass simulator tests
twice a year.37 They propose that in addition to compre-
hensive medical testing at semi-annual intervals before age
sixty, their approach would mandate testing at quarterly in-
tervals after age sixty.3 8 Likewise, to ensure that safety stan-
dards are maintained, airline inspectors and FAA officials
board planes without warning to observe pilots from time to
time. 9
Older pilots are frustrated because the thirty year old
rule makes little sense today in light of the improvements in
general health and the "miraculous improvements in medi-
cal testing."4" Their frustration stems from their inability to
prove they can fly safely because the rule prohibits their fly-
ing larger planes at all.4
4. Airlines Support a Change in the Rule
Several major airlines support modifying the Age Sixty
Rule. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the third-largest U.S. carrier,
conditionally supports changing the rule up to age sixty-two
as long as the change would not be retroactive.42 For Delta,
a change in the rule would generate tremendous savings in
training costs, one of the most expensive areas of the airline
36 Id.
37 Id.
" 47 FED. REG. 29,782, supra note 5. The pilots' proposed approach would in-
volve at least annual comprehensive flight proficiency tests, in addition to the cur-
rent standard proficiency test. This proposed comprehensive flight proficiency test
would include gathering quantitative objective performance data under stressed
conditions and fatigue in a LOFT-type (Line-Oriented Flight Training) simulation
under conditions of fatigue and exhaustion; assessing vigilance, handling of work-
load, and complex decisionmaking situations; and evaluating the pilots' ability to




41 Kessler, supra note 31, at 1.
42 Sidel, supra note 12, at 1.
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business.43 Southwest Airlines Pilots Association went even
further by donating $50,000 to the Professional Pilots Fed-
eration to aid efforts to change the rule." Continental Air
Line's CEO, Robert R. Ferguson, III, worried that in addi-
tion to serving no purpose today, except to discriminate on
the basis of age, the rule "arbitrarily forces [their] most ex-
perienced skilled pilots into retirement."45 Similarly, Amer-
ican Air Lines CEO and President Robert Crandall wants to
modify the rule because experience is "extraordinarily im-
portant in aviation and having the ability to retain the serv-
ices of our senior, well-trained captains for a few more years
would represent a step forward in our efforts to be certain
that American's cockpits are always manned by the most
qualified people."46
Pilots also found support in the Carnegie Inquiry Into
the Third Age, a report on aging which found very few dif-
ferences between the skills of older and younger workers.47
According to this report, the real difference between older
and younger workers is that younger workers have "greater
ambition, 'trainability,' flexibility, better health, informa-
tion technology skills, qualifications and mobility, whereas
older workers' strengths are their stability, reliability, com-
mitment, responsibility, maturity, and managerial skills. 48
Though no specific ages were targeted, the traits inherent
in the age-related groups arguably may cancel out each
other with respect to pilots' flying ability.49 While airlines
fear that older pilots might be "technophobic" and unable
to learn new technology, this report showed that, although
those between ages fifty and sixty were slightly slower to
learn, their improvement rate matched that of the younger
workers.50 While the older pilots' learning curve might be
43 Id. (citing Neil Monroe, Delta spokesman).
44 Morris, supra note 5, at 1.
45 Reingold, supra note 10, at 184.
46 Id.
47 Victoria McKee, Frontiers of Work: Why the Older Dogs Can be Taught New Tricks,
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more gradual, their dedication, maturity and commitment
to improving their skills allows them to improve at the same
rate as younger pilots.
B. THE RULE'S GREATEST CRITICISM
The greatest criticism of the rule focuses upon its arbi-
trariness. Most of the rule's opponents find the selected
age to be based on "armchair guesswork and stereotyped
thinking about the beginning of old age," not "chosen on
the basis of scientific medical studies. '51  The only good
thing that can be said about the rule is that it is motivated
by a concern for public safety.5
2
C. AN ATrACK ON THE OTA FLIGHT TIME STUDY
The OTA Flight Time Study, which is the foundation for
much of the FAA's argument supporting the rule as it pres-
ently reads, likewise attracts criticism from the rule's oppo-
nents. Actually, the OTA report reaches no conclusion on
whether or not the FAA should abandon the Age Sixty
Rule.53 Critics assert that the study contains no accurate
and relevant airline flying time data.54 Instead the Flight
Time data, which represents the over-sixty pilots, uses infor-
mation from inherently more dangerous flying such as
crop-dusting, medical evaluation, pipeline and fire patrol,
traffic surveillance, and law enforcement, as compared to
the commercial passenger-carrying flights of the younger
pilots. 55 The report compared accident rates of pilots in
age groups by ten-year intervals and concluded that pilots
between ages sixty and sixty-nine have an accident rate that
is 2.1 times higher than the accident rate for the fifty to
fifty-nine year-olds, but lower than pilots in the thirty to
51 Robert N. Butler, When Pilots Turn 60: Experience vs. Age, WASH. POST, July 25,
1989, at Z6.
52 Id.
53 Perry Bradley, Recent and Total Flight Time Have Stronger Influence on Accidents
Than Age Alone, OTA Report Concludes, AIR SAFET WK., Sept. 24, 1990, at 1.
51 Donald L. Hardison, Safety and Older Pilots, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1990, at 1.
5 Id.
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thirty-nine year-old and twenty to twenty-nine year-old age
brackets.56
Another study conducted by the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB), however, found that the majority of
accidents were caused by mental error, not medical impair-
ment or incapacitation.57 The report found that the types
of failures in pilot performance that contributed to plane
accidents were primarily caused by decision and judgment
factors such as failure to follow procedures, failure to see
and avoid other aircraft, attempted operation using defec-
tive equipment, and other misperceptions and misjudg-
ments.58 These are errors that can be trained away, and are
not attributable to age-related incapacitation. One pro-
rule advocate, FAA aviation medical examiner Richard D.
Reinhart, said "age is a factor; getting older is a factor. A
specific age is not."59 If nothing else, both sides recognize
the arbitrariness of the particular age-year selected for the
rule.
III. CASE HISTORY BACKGROUND OF THE
CHALLENGE
The Age Sixty Rule has been challenged since its incep-
tion.60 In Air Line Pilots Association, International v. Quesada
the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), which now supports
the rule, sued the FAA seeking an injunction rendering the
rule null and void before it even went into effect.61 The
- OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND THE AGE 60 RULE
FOR AIRLINE PILOTS (1990) [hereinafter OTA report], at attach. I (technical analysis
by Robert S. McDonough, M.D.).
57 Id. at 2. The NTSB study also provided a breakdown of the specific episodes of
pilot incapacitation. Id.
- Id. at 2-3.
59 Reingold, supra note 10, at 184.
-0 See Monroe & EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc. & Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 736 F.2d
394 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1983), affd in part, Trans World
Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. Ill. (1985); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 276
F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1962); Thompson & Fowler v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 795 F. Supp. 1337 (C.C.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 993 F.2d 266
(3rd Cir. 1993).
61 Quesada, 276 F.2d at 892.
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FAA has given various justifications for the rule. For exam-
ple, in 1959, the FAAjustified the rule saying:
(a) there is a progressive deterioration of certain important
physiological and psychological functions with age, that sig-
nificant medical defects attributable to the degenerative
process occur at an increasing rate as age increases, and that
sudden incapacity due to such medical defects becomes sig-
nificantly more frequent in any group reaching'age 60,....
and that such incapacity, due primarily to heart attacks and
strokes, cannot be predicted accurately as to any specific in-
dividual on the basis of presently available scientific tests
and criteria .. . [so that] [a]ny attempt to be selective in
predicting which individuals are likely to suffer an incapaci-
tating attack would be futile under the circumstances and
would not be medically sound.62
Moreover, the FAA also stated that other factors, impossible
to measure precisely, such as the "loss of ability to perform
highly skilled tasks rapidly, to resist fatigue, to maintain
physical stamina, to perform effectively in a complex and
stressful environment, to apply experience, judgment and
reasoning rapidly to new, changing and emergency situa-
tions, and to learn new techniques, skills and procedures,"
coupled with medical defects, assume greater significance.63
On the other side, the ALPA claimed that the rule de-
prived pilots of their property rights without due process 64
and "was arbitrary, discriminatory and without reasonable
relation to the standards set forth" in the Federal Aviation
Act.65 The trial court denied the ALPA's motion for a pre-
liminary injunction of the rule. After the plaintiffs ap-
pealed this denial of their motion for the preliminary
injunction and judgment was reserved on the defendant
Administrator's cross motion for summary judgment,66 the
62 24 FED. REG. 9767 (1959).
'- Baker v. F.A.A., 917 F.2d. 318, 323 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936
(1991).
"A Quesada, 276 F.2d at 894.
65 Shawn T. Wells, From the Cockpit to the Nursing Home: A Look at the Recent Develop-
ments in the Law Concerning the Age-60 Rule, 57 J. AIR L. & COM. 755, 757 (1992)
(citing Quesada, 276 F.2d at 894).
66 Quesada, 276 F.2d at 894.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed the trial court's ruling.6 7 The Second Circuit held
this administrative regulation reasonable because regula-
tions limit a person's property right when the restriction
imposed preserves public health and safety.6
The rule next withstood challenges from pilots arising
out of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA).69 The courts again found that Congress had cre-
ated exceptions in the ADEA that allowed employers to dis-
criminate based on age when age is a "bona fide
occupational qualification" (BFOQ). 70
A. SUPREME COURT CHALLENGES
Pilots have challenged the Age Sixty Rule in all levels of
the United States courts. Recently, in Western Air Lines, Inc.
v. Criswell,71 two pilot captains over sixty sued their em-
ployer, Western Air Lines. Western had denied their appli-
cations for reassignment to the position of flight
engineer.7 2 The pilots sued under the ADEA stating that
Western violated the Act when it applied the Age Sixty Rule
67 Id.
- Id. at 896.
- 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
70 Id. Section 623 states that an employer may not:
(1) fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's age;
(2) limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's age; or
(3) reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
Act.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
7- 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
On a Boeing 727 and the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10, three crew members are
in the cockpit: a captain, a first officer, and a flight engineer. The captain is the
pilot who controls the plane and assumes responsibility for all phases of the flight
operation. The first officer is the copilot. The flight engineer monitors a side-fac-
ing instrument panel, but does not actually fly the controls unless an emergency
situation arises wherein the captain and first officer are incapacitated. Id. at 403
(citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 114 (1985)).
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to the flight engineerjob. The district court found that be-
cause the flight engineer's normal duties are not critical to
flight safety except in emergency situations, there was no
merit in Western's BFOQ defense.73 The court of appeals
affirmed this decision granting the pilots equitable relief.74
In doing so, the court of appeals specifically rejected West-
ern's argument that the BFOQ defense was expressly used
in deference to a legitimate concern for passenger safety.75
The United States Supreme Court, after reviewing the
legislative history of the rule and of the original ADEA,7 6
used the two-part test adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Usery v
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. 77 to hold that the Age Sixty Rule
satisfies the BFOQ exception. 78  The Respondent's Brief
from the Criswell case sets out the Tamiami test most sim-
ply.79 The Diaz prong or "essence" prong requires that job
qualifications be reasonably related to the essence of the
particular business.80 The second prong or Weeks prong
73 Id. at 406-08. The district court further informed the jury that Western could
have established a valid BFOQ defense by proving: (1) that in 1978, the year in
which these pilots were retired, it would have been entirely impractical to deal with
each second officer over sixty individually to test and predict his or her particular
ability to perform the job safely; and (2) that some second officers over age 60 did
possess traits of physiological, psychological or other medical problems that did di-
minish safe and efficient job performance and that these traits cannot be tested
accurately by means other than uniformly applying a blanket age cut-off. Id. at 407-
08.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 408.
- 29 U.S.C. 623(f). The ADEA exception allows age discrimination:
where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of the particular business, or where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age; or where
such practices involve an employee in a work place in a foreign coun-
try, and compliance with such subsections would cause such employer,
or a corporation controlled by such employer, to violate the laws of
the country in which such work place is located;
Id.
77 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
78 CriswelI 472 U.S. at 416-17 (citing Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 413); see also Wells,
supra note 65, at 762-63.
79 Brief for Criswell, at 1, Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985)
(No. 83-1545) [hereinafter Western Respondent's Brief].
-o Id.
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can be satisfied by meeting either of two sub-prongs.8 1 The
first sub-prong requires the employer to prove that it has a
reasonable cause, a factual basis, for the belief that all or
substantially all persons over the age limit would be unable
to perform safely the job duties involved. 2 Alternatively,
the second sub-prong of the Weeks test requires the em-
ployer to prove that it is highly impractical to assess the safe
job performance of persons over the proscribed age limit
on an individual basis.8 3  Using this test,8 4 the Court af-
firmed the appellate court's decision and upheld the Age
Sixty Mandatory Retirement Rule for pilots.8 5 The Court,
however, rejected Western's extension of the rule's applica-
tion to include flight engineers because the qualifications




84 The two-prong test developed in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408
F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969), and Diaz v. Pan American World Airlines, Inc., 442 F.2d
385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), first requires the employer objec-
tively to show that the discriminatory hiring or employment practices are "reason-
ably necessary to the essence of [the employer's] business." Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 236.
The second prong may be met in two ways because it requires age qualifications to
be more than convenient or reasonable; they must be reasonably necessary to the
particular business which is found only when an employer must rely on age as a
proxy for the safety-related job qualifications from the first prong. Id. The em-
ployer can satisfy this second prong by establishing a factual basis for belief that
substantially all persons over a certain age could not meet the duties of the job safely
and efficiently or by showing that there is no possible or practical way to test each
older worker on an individual basis. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 418; Tamiami, 531 F.2d at
235; see also Wells, supra note 65, at 762-63.
-' Criswel, 472 U.S. at 423; see aL/oJane W. May, The Bona Fide Occupational Qualifi-
cation Exception - Clarifying the Meaning of "Occupational Qualication," 38 VAND. L.
REv. 1345, 1367 n. 192 (1985).
86 Criswell, 472 U.S. at 418. Courts have been using a more stringent BFOQ test
lately. First, the court must apply the Diaz test, where the Fifth Circuit added a
threshold requirement to the application of the BFOQ exception, assuring that the
mandatory age is substantially related to the essential function of the business. Basi-
cally, the Diaz prong considers a BFOQ valid only when the "essence of the business
operation would be undermined" by failing to follow the discriminatory hiring prac-
tice, making it a "business necessity test, not a business convenience test." May, supra
note 85, at 1351. Before applying the Weeks test as explained by Tamiami, the court
must closely evaluate the specific duties involved with the employee's job. If the
court finds the job is a specific assignment such as that of a pilot, it must examine
the job requirements that the pilot has "actually performed in the past and is likely
to perform in the future." May, supra note 85, at 1367. This new test better effectu-
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B. SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT ADDRESSES THE AGE SIXTY
RULE
Various circuit courts have also upheld the Age Sixty
Mandatory Retirement Rule.87 Two Seventh Circuit cases,
Aman v. FAA8 ' and Baker v. FAA89, are particularly insightful
in their analysis of the most recent challenges to the Age
Sixty Rule.
1. Aman v. FAA
The Aman court, like other courts before it, denied
twenty-eight airline captains' and flight engineers' appeal
from FAA decisions denying their petition for exemption
from the Age Sixty Mandatory Retirement Rule. 9° The
FAA's denials stated that granting individual exemptions
would not maintain the level of safety achieved by uniform
enforcement of mandatory retirement at sixty. Aman ini-
tially arose because the FAA and courts disregarded the rec-
ommendation of a six-member panel comprised of five
physicians and a psychologist qualified in the fields of cardi-
ology, aerospace medicine, and neuropsychology.
ates the legislative intent for ADEA's BFOQ exception as it prevents employers from
misusing the BFOQ exception as a means of circumventing the purpose of the
ADEA legislation. Id. at 1368.
87 Baker v. FAA, 917 F.2d 31R (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1338 (1991);
Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc., 755 F.2d
94 (7th Cir. 1985); Monroe, 736 F.2d at 394; Trans Worl, 713 F.2d at 940; Rombough
v. FAA, 594 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1979); Gray v. FAA, 594 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1979);
Coppenbarger v. FAA, 558 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977); Quesada, 276 F.2d at 892.
88 856 F.2d at 946.
89 917 F.2d at 318.
- Aman, 856 F.2d at 949. The pilot-petitioner's original petition for exemption
included recommendations from the six-member "Age 60 Exemption Panel," which
comprised five physicians and a psychologist with impressive qualifications in the
areas of cardiology, aerospace medicine, and neuropsychology. This panel had de-
veloped an extensive battery of physiological and psychological tests to assess the
fitness of pilots over age 60. In the petition, the panel stated that this battery of
tests, if administered and supplemented properly by additional medical tests and
used with the existing operational tests already required by the FAA and airlines,
could adequately provide for exemptions from the Age 60 Rule. Id.
91 Id.
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The pilot-petitioners had two main arguments concern-
ing this protocol test which the Aman court discounted.92
The pilots' first argument was that pilots older than sixty,
who are psychologically and medically able to meet FAA
and airline operational testing standards, are no more likely
to cause accidents due to sudden incapacitation or unde-
tected deterioration of piloting skills than pilots younger
than sixty. To successfully maintain this claim, the court
required the pilots to demonstrate that the FAA had little
or no substantial evidence for the finding that the strict en-
forcement of the Age Sixty Rule, with no exemptions
granted, does reduce age-related risks of incapacitation and
undetected deterioration of the pilots' flying skills.93
The FAA, in support of the rule, stated that error and
risks of age-related incapacitation could not accurately be
screened out.94 The FAA used expert testimony to indicate
the increased risk of physical deterioration among pilots
over the age of sixty occurring during the time span be-
tween the required biannual medical tests. The Aman court
reviewed the evidence that stated that no available tests, as
set forth by the pilot-petitioners, by the airlines, or by the
FAA, could accurately identify or predict possible losses of
flying skills.95 After considering the FAA's evidence and
that supplied by the experts of the pilot-petitioners, the
court concluded that because the petitioner's protocol bat-
tery of tests could not eliminate "all the incremental risk
associated with sudden incapacitation or undetected deteri-
oration of skills among pilots over sixty, a substantial body
of medical opinion continues 'to doubt the feasibility"' of
the pilot-petitioner's battery of tests as an accurate predic-
tor of pilot risk.96
92 See Wells, supra note 65, at 772.
93 Aman, 856 F.2d at 949.
94 The FAA asserted in its Denial of Exemption No. 25,008, at 13 (Sept. 8, 1987),
that the likelihood of sudden death, disability, or incapacitation accelerates with age
by each additional year and that to grant exemptions would compromise the level of
safety. Aman, 856 F.2d at 949.
91 Aman, 856 F.2d at 949.
96 Id.
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In their second claim, the pilot-petitioners argued that
older pilots who satisfied the protocol and existing opera-
tional tests possess greater experience, and are therefore
safer than the average younger pilots, making them deserv-
ing of exemption from the Age Sixty Rule. According to
the court, the FAA did not adequately address this issue.97
The court noted that the FAA did not "present findings of
fact supported by substantial evidence (or even by the pre-
sumably lesser quantum of evidence required to avoid arbi-
trariness and capriciousness) or to identify the governing
principles and set forth a 'rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.' "98 In addressing this
second claim, the court considered the pilot-petitioners' ev-
idence, which included a comparison of accident rates rep-
resented by various age groups of pilots with commercial
and air carrier certificates.99 The court found that the com-
parison demonstrated below average accident rates for pi-
lots between fifty-five years and fifty-nine years and the age
sixty and over group.100
After finding the FAA's response to the pilot-petitioners'
petition "incomplete," because the FAA failed to present
any factual or legal basis to support its rejection of the pilot-
petitioners' claim of experience increasing with age, the
Aman court then remanded the case to the FAA for expla-
nations concerning the FAA's deficiencies."' The pilots
then supplemented their original petitions with additional
exhibits from over 200 scientists, physicians, aviation indus-
try officials and other pilots, as well as interest organiza-
97 Id. at 955.
98 Id.
9 Id.
1oo Aman, 856 F.2d at 955. Clearly, this data included the accident rates for the
age 60 and over pilots not subject to the rule. Id.
10 Id. The court noted the deficiencies in the FAA's evidence supporting the
dismissal of the pilots' petition, as the FAA failed to give facts supported by substan-
tial evidence or even the evidence necessary to avoid arbitrariness and capricious-
ness. Id. Likewise, the FAA failed to identify governing principles or find a rational
nexus between the facts they presented and the age chosen. Id. Moreover, the court
noted the FAA's failure to give any facts supporting its rejection of the pilots' asser-
tion that older pilots' experience offset the existence of undetected physical loss. Id.
For a more detailed analysis of Aman, see Wells, supra note 65, at 771-778.
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tions. 1 2 The amended Petitioner's Brief now included
evidence which the pilot-petitioners felt supported their
cause in several ways. The brief stated that in the aviation
field, pilot experience increases safety, while pilot inexperi-
ence has caused fatal accidents. 10 3 The brief further stated
that aviation industry experts unanimously support the the-
ory that experience is possibly the most critical factor for
determining airline safety. Moreover, forced retirements
because of the Age Sixty Rule have created a shortage of
qualified and experienced pilots as well as a reduction in
overall cockpit experience levels. 10 4 The amended brief in-
cluded aviation accident statistics that indicate that accident
rates decline as pilots' age and experience increases." 5
The pilot-petitioners argued in the brief that older pilots
should be given the same treatment as pilots with serious
disabilities whom the FAA has specially exempted and al-
lowed to return to work.'06 Finally, the pilot-petitioners ar-
gued that the advances in medical science strongly support
exemptions from the Age Sixty Rule.' 7 They supported
this claim with evidence that their medical and psychologi-
cal testing protocol, developed by a medical panel of ex-
perts, has gone unchallenged by the scientific and medical
community in its ability to screen pilots who are over the
age of sixty.'08 With this new support, the public docket
was reopened. 09
The FAA, however, represented by the Director of Flight
Standards Service, once again denied the petition for ex-
102 Brief for Baker at 6, Baker v. FAA, 917 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-2524),
cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1388 (1991) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief]. After the submis-
sion of the original petition in Aman v. FAA, Melvin Aman withdrew his name as a
petitioner. Denial of Exemption, In the matter of Courtney Y. Bennett, andJohn H.
Baker, FAA Nos. 25,008 and 25,524, at 1 [hereinafter Denial of Exemption, FAA Nos.
25,008 and 25,524] (citing Wells, supra note 65, at 776.)
103 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 102, at 6.




-00 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 102, at 6.
109 Id.
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emption on May 26, 1989.110 The FAA denied the exemp-
tion for several explicit reasons. The FAA stated that the
pilot-petitioner's data in the brief was suspect and that de-
spite medical diagnosis, treatment and prevention, pilots as
they age will nonetheless experience some decline in areas
necessary for flight performance and safety."1 The areas
the FAA targeted for age-based decline included mental
psychomotor, emotional, intellectual, and physical attrib-
utes.1 12 To support this claim, the FAA admitted that while
there may be individual exceptions, data exist which
demonstrate that the general population exhibits rates of
disability and death because of physical changes and disor-
ders accompanying aging." 3 Finally, the FAA's denial notes
that in the general population, the aging process is too un-
predictable and individualized, involving too many vari-
ables which make it immeasurable. 1 4 Thus, airline safety
could be compromised. The FAA downplayed the pilots'
claim that pilots who are sixty and over are similar to medi-
cally-exempt younger pilots, claiming that younger pilots
can be tested to monitor medical problems. 15 The FAA
will issue exemptions only when technology has developed
a technique to assess the pilots' abilities and detect
problems. 16 Clearly, the FAA has determined that medical
technology cannot accomplish this with aging pilots suscep-
tible to acute cardiovascular or neurologically induced inca-
pacitation or any other cognitive disabilities."17





"1 Denial of Exemption, FAA Nos. 25,008 and 25, 524, supra note 102, at 32.
116 Id.
17 Id. at 32-34; see Wells, supra note 65, at 778, n. 124 (discussing the FAA's foun-
dation for denying the exemption based on the controversial "Flight Time Study").
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2. Baker v. FAA' 8
a. The Baker Court's Examination of the Pilot-
Petitioners' Evidence
In Baker v. FAA thirty-one pilot-petitioners pursued their
suit by filing an appeal on July 21, 1989, alleging that the
FAA's denial lacked substantial evidence. 1 9 Again, the peti-
tioners attacked the FAA's denial based on the Flight Time
Study.1 20  The pilot-petitioners attacked the Flight Time
Study in two ways. The petitioners argued that the FAA's
report that showed an increase in accident rates of pilots
over the age of sixty had a fatal flaw as it artificially deflated
the accident rates for pilots below the age of sixty.121 More-
over, the petitioners claimed that because the report actu-
ally showed a decrease in pilot accident rates with
increasing pilot experience, then the report actually sup-
ports an exemption for older pilots who have more experi-
ence. 122 Further, the petitioners stated that if the study
excluded the flawed groupings, age sixty and over, then the
accident rates actually declined with age.123 Likewise, the
petitioners emphasized that increasing pilot experience
corresponds directly with substantial reductions in accident
rates, while accident rates decrease with age in the only
class of general aviators which the flaw did not affect. 12 4
When such flaw was removed, the accident rate for general
aviation pilots remained constant to age. 125 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals still rejected petitioners' claims
and again affirmed the FAA's decision to refuse to grant the
-18 917 F.2d at 318.
19 Id.; see also Petitioner's Brief, supra note 102, at 2. For a further discussion of
Baker and the Flight Time Study, see Wells, supra note 65, at 779, n. 126 and accom-
panying text.
- The pilots claim the Flight Time Study data was flawed as it excluded airline
and commuter pilots' accidents while including the air carrier flight time. Peti-
tioner's Brief, supra note 103, at 13.
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exemptions.1 26 The court found the petitioners' claim lack-
ing substantial evidence. 27 Likewise, the court held that
the petitioners had failed to carry their burden to show that
extenuating factors justified the Age Sixty Rule exemptions,
even given the FAA's expansive discretionary authority con-
cerning this area and the notable concern with public
safety. 128
The court also extended this intrusive scrutiny into its
examination of the FAA's evidence. 2 9 The Baker court
started with an attack on the FAA's dependence on the
Flight Time Study, finding discrepancies between the
number of accidents resulting from pilots younger than
sixty juxtaposed to the number of pilots over sixty.13 0 That
the study recognized millions of safe air carrier miles flown
by pilots under sixty, while statistics on safe carrier miles for
pilots over age sixty were not available because of the Age
Sixty Rule, did not escape the Baker court's attention. 3'
The court quickly recognized the Flight Time Study bias
which drastically understated the accident rates for all pilots
under sixty while overstating the accident rates for those
pilots over age sixty.' 32
Likewise, the court discredited the FAA's analogy com-
paring fatal car accidents to aircraft accidents because of
pilots' training, tested skills, proven ability, and medical fit-
ness.133 The court found the value of this analogy dimin-
ished because elderly people seem more likely to die as a
result of traffic accidents because of the effects134 of aging
on the body and the difficulty of physical rehabilitation.
26 Baker, 917 F.2d at 319.
127 Id.
128 Id.
I- Id. at 320-21.
130 Id. at 320. The court specifically noted the flaws in the study. The pilot-peti-
tioners pointed out the flaw itself when they showed that airline and commuter pi-
lots' accidents were not included in the data compilations but air carrier flight time
was included. Id. at 320-21.
13' Baker, 917 F.2d at 319.
132 Id. at 320.
135 Id. at 321.
134 Id. at 321.
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Likewise, the court noted that the FAA failed to consider
the amount of exposure experienced by older drivers as
compared to that of older pilots, considering their contin-
ued training, medical fitness and experience.1 35
Similar to the court's observation in Aman, the Baker
court noted the petitioner's failure to disprove the FAA's
claim that "[a] ssessing the risks associated with determining
which pilots may fly beyond age [sixty] concerns detrimental
conditions which are unknown." 36 The pilots had no test
battery which could indicate with certainty the age-related
deterioration of skills.1 37 Clearly, from the discussion, the
court felt forced to rule against the pilots because of the
lack of reliable tests that would justify a change in the rule
forcing immediate retirement at sixty regardless of the pi-
lots' physical and mental condition. 138
The court acknowledged the petitioners' "catch-22" situa-
tion nothing that pilots "cannot get exemptions until they
show they can fly large passenger aircraft safely, and they
cannot show they can fly such planes safely until they get
exemptions."3 9 Overall, the court recognized the testimo-
nials of experts in flying and medicine to the experience
and judgment of the older pilots, but was restrained by the
infeasibility of testing the good health and performance of
the pilots.1 40 The court explicitly denied the dissent's at-
tack by stating they were not "holding that every airline pi-
lot, on his or her [sixtieth] birthday, and regardless of
physical condition or experience, becomes a significantly
greater safety hazard than before .... 14
135 Id.
- Baker, 917 F.2d at 321.
137 Aman, 856 F.2d at 954.
'13 Baker, 917 F.2d at 321.
139 Id. at 322.
140 Id. at 319 ("[Wle cannotjustify a conclusion that, on average, experience suffi-
ciently offsets possible age-related impairment of health or skills to clearly guarantee
a net constancy or increase in safety."). This court concluded that while the pilots
did give evidence showing pilots 60 or older had more experience than average
younger crew members, they failed to show that there was a need for that increased
experience. Id. at 320.
141 Id. at 322. Any statistical comparisons given are suspect because pilots over
age 60 are not allowed to fly larger passenger aircraft. Id. at 321.
1994]
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In conclusion, the Baker court warned the FAA that it did
not hold that the pilot-petitioners' arguments were wrong
but instead urged the FAA to examine this area carefully. 4 2
Although the court might be unwilling to overrule the
agency at this time, the rule is not "sacrosanct and untouch-
able." 43  The court warned that the rule might be over-
ruled if future evidence of accurate individual testing so
demands.'44
b. The Baker Dissent
The Baker dissent attacked the FAA's rigid conformance
to this rule. 4 5 The dissent questioned the FAA's justifica-
tions for the blanket denial of all petitions for exemptions
from the rule's enforcement. 146 Senior District Judge Will
challenged the Aman court's direction for the FAA on re-
mand.'4 7 In fact, the dissent after listing the various tests
and batteries available, expressed its disbelief that the FAA
cannot reliably test all pilots and attacked the FAA's balanc-
ing test between physical deterioration and pilot
experience. 48
Moreover, the dissent noted that even if a pilot was sud-
denly incapacitated, the "safety net" is not that pilot's expe-
rience but the presence of the other two qualified pilots in
the cockpit. 49 An airline cockpit crew usually consists of
142 Id. at 323.
143 Baker, 917 F.2d at 322.
144 Id. at 322-23.
145 Id. at 323-24.
146 Id. at 324. Senior District Judge Will found it ridiculous that pilots with
thousands of flying hours and flawless records, who have passed every physical bat-
tery and flight test, are suddenly grounded on their 60th birthdays, even though
they had flown up to standards the day before without any restrictions and are
deemed qualified the day after to fly planes with 30 or fewer passengers. Id. at 323.
147 Id. at 324. The dissent stated that the majority in Aman had offered no gui-
dance for the FAA on how to review the denial on remand. Id.
148 Id. at 323-24. The dissent noted that the FAA had identified the skills and
physical and cognitive abilities necessary for flying but could not find any way to test
for them in pilots over 60, while at the same time testing them in pilots under 60. Id.
at 324. See Wells, supra note 65, at 787; see also supra notes 60-71 and accompanying
text.
149 Baker, 917 F.2d at 324.
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three pilots: the pilot-in-command (captain), the co-pilot
(first officer), and the flight engineer (second officer)., 5 °
Because their responsibilities overlap considerably and all
three focus on tasks of information gathering, problem
solving, decision making, psycho-motor coordination, and
transmission of information to the airport system, each part
of the team is trained to take over if there is any emergency
on the plane, thus the "safety net" feature.
1 5 1
The dissent vigorously attacked the FAA's continued de-
pendence on the flawed Flight Time Study when the major-
ity in Aman found aspects of it to support the petitioner's
claim.1 52 The dissent explained why the pilot-petitioners
have had to rely on the presented stories of pilots on the
brink of sixty performing heroic deeds and saving lives
where less experienced pilots might have failed. Finally,
the dissent, in accord with the majority, recognized the pi-
lots' dilemma in being unable to produce data to show that
pilots over age sixty are as safe as younger pilots.
1 5 3
The dissent expressed concern about the FAA's willing-
ness to reissue "special permits" to pilots under sixty recov-
ering from heart disease, drug abuse, and alcoholism, while
simultaneously denying exemptions from the Age Sixty
1w 47 Fed. Reg. 29,782, supra note 5; see also supra note 72.
151 Id.
152 Baker, 917 F.2d at 323 (listing flight simulator tests, vision and depth percep-
tion tests, hearing tests, stress tests, blood tests, psychological workups, x-rays, angi-
ograms, and EKGs). The dissent explained that as pilots grow older, the way their
experience offsets the decrease in skills depends on two factors: (1) how much expe-
rience does the pilot have; and (2) have the pilot's skills 'deteriorated'? Id. at 325.
Yet this argument cannot be disproved because, the FAA argues, the second cannot
be measured reliably. Id.
153 Id. (citing Aman, 856 F.2d at 957). The pilot-petitioners presented the story
of what has been termed the "heroic deed" of a 59 year-old Captain David Cronin,
who on his second-to-last flight emergency landed a 747 Boeing after its cargo door
blew open in mid-flight. Overcoming the failure of two of the plane's four engines,
Cronin chose to disregard emergency operating procedures which required him to
dive, reduce speed, and drop the landing gear. Relying on his 38 years of experi-
ence, Cronin ignored that advice because it would have caused the plane to lose too
much altitude. Instead, Cronin, operating manual controls, saved the lives of all
passengers and crew, with the exception of the nine killed immediately by the cargo
door, by landing the malfunctioning plane safely at a much higher than normal
speed. Id. at 319-20.
1994] 353
354 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
Rule. 154 The FAA responded in Aman to this kind of attack
by explaining that current tests can predict the course of
medical deficiencies accurately but cannot accurately pre-
dict the deficiencies accompanying the aging process. 155
The Baker dissent noted, however, that the FAA offered no
evidence to support that distinction in medical testing,
which allows the FAA to grant special permits to younger
pilots while refusing even to set forth criteria and sensible
regulations, much less exemptions, for pilots over sixty. 15 6
Again agreeing with the majority, the dissent ridiculed
the FAA's comparison of age-related fatalities of automobile
traffic accidents to age-related in-flight accidents of pilots
over the age of sixty. 5" Recognizing the need for advanced
technology, the dissent indicated a desire to remand this
case for action in the following three areas: (1) the FAA
should adopt "regulations establishing ascertainable and
meaningful standards to govern the granting of at least
some exemptions to the [Age Sixty Rule]" because the pres-
ent FAA regulations fail to guide the FAA in exercising its
available discretion; (2) the FAA should show, with current
substantial evidence, that all pilots over sixty are signifi-
cantly more prone to "sudden incapacitation" than younger
pilots; and (3) the FAA should provide a significant expla-
nation for its treating requests for medical exemption cer-
tificates under 14 C.F.R. § 67.19 differently from Age Sixty
Rule exemptions.1 5 8
IV. PRESENT CONSIDERATION OF THE RULE: THE
MOST RECENT CHALLENGE
Since the beginning of the Age Sixty Rule, everyone has
agreed that age sixty is an arbitrary cut-off. 59 For instance,
in 1990 Boeing Airlines raised the retirement age of its test
- Id. at 325-26.
"' Id. at 325.
" Baker, 917 F.2d at 325.
1-7 Id at 326; see supra note 133 and accompanying text for explanation.
158 Id. at 326-27.
IN Older Pilots, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 23, 1990, at A18.
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pilots to sixty-three believing the theory that medical testing
had become more reliable and individuals more health
conscious. As test pilots undergo "more grueling" and
more dangerous work than that normally experienced by
airline pilots, other airlines could adopt a similar exten-
sion. 60 After Boeing's change, which resulted from a settle-
ment with twenty-eight pilots who received a total of $4.4
million in back pay, EEOC attorney Steve O'Rourke stated,
"there's a growing realization of the ability of medical sci-
ence to detect medical risk on an individual basis. You
[don't] need to use this broad brush of an age rule." 6 ' Fur-
thermore, similar agreements had been reached with Lock-
heed and Rockwell International. McDonald Aircraft
Company in St. Louis, which makes military aircraft, elimi-
nated the age rule, as have General Dynamics Corporation,
Northrop Corporation, and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. 6 2 Following EEOC v. Boeing Co.,l 6s
filed in 1984, Douglas Aircraft Co. made a compromise with
their pilots to allow them to keep flying until age sixty-five,
as long as they pass more stringent physical exams. 64
Although opportunities have arisen for change, the FAA
and Congress have been reluctant to extend the Rule. In
1979, the House voted 240 to 165 to kill a bill that would
have allowed airline pilots to fly eighteen months past their
sixtieth birthday, pending outcome of a National Institute
of Health study on the effects of aging in pilots.' 65 Because
of this arbitrariness, various organizations and individuals
have challenged the rule.
A. AN ATTACK ON THE AGE SIxTY RULE IN CONGRESS
On October 19, 1989, Iowa Republican Congressman
James Lightfoot introduced a bill to raise the mandatory
160 Id.
161 Morris, supra note 5, at 1.
162 Id.
163 843 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1988).
'A' Morris, supra note 5, at 1.
I6 WASH. PosT, Dec. 13, 1979, at Md. 8.
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pilot retirement age to sixty-five. 166 In response, the House
Public Works And Transportation Investigations Oversight
Subcommittee required the Office of Technology Assess-
ment (OTA) to review the Age Sixty Rule medical as-
pects. 167 After the OTA's results168 were revealed, the 1989
bill failed. However, in March of 1993, Republican Jim
Lightfoot plans to reintroduce legislation that would raise
the mandatory pilot retirement age to sixty-five. 169
Lightfoot's new attack again cites the unpublished FAA
Civil Aviation Medical Institute report, which concluded
there is no medical evidence to support the age restric-
tions.1 70 Representative Lightfoot claims, "the Federal Gov-
ernment continues to practice age discrimination on our
16 Reingold, supra note 10, at 184.
167 H.R. REP. No. 3498, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). This bill sought to amend
section 602(b) of the 1958 Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. 1422(b) (1988)) with the
following addition to the end of the Act:
(3) Limitation on Age Restrictions. - The Administrator shall not,
solely by reason of the age of a person, if such person is less than 65
years of age -
(A) refuse to issue an airman certificate to, or refuse to renew such
certificate for, such person, if such person is applying for the issuance
or renewal of such certificate in order to serve or continue to serve as a
pilot of an aircraft; or
(B) require an air carrier to terminate the employment of, or refuse
to employ, such person as a pilot on an aircraft of such air carrier.
H.R. 3438.
-6 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND THE
AGE 60 RULE FOR AIRLINE PILOTS (1990) [hereinafter OTA REPORT], at fig.3. The
study compared the number of accidents per 100,000 pilot hours for pilots in the
age intervals of 17-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, and 70 and over. Id. Then
the report graphed the accident rates varying with three varying levels of pilot flight
experience: 51-100 hours/year; 101-400 hours/year; and 401 hours and above. Id.
The data showed that there is a beneficial effect of flying experience existing at all
levels (supporting the pilot-petitioners' claim). However, there is no interaction
with age in pilots flying fewer than 100 hours per year. Thus, for pilots flying more
than 100 hours per year, increasing age (likely accompanied by increasing total ex-
perience) and increased flying time have beneficial effects on those pilots' abilities.
After the age 60, however, accident rates increase even if pilots continue to fly over
400 hours per year. Id.
16 See H.R. 1532, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
170 311 Aviation Daily 341 (1993). The OTA suggested that any medical certifica-
tion standard changes made should be determined by balancing a number of fac-
tors: public safety, costs of a more complete medical examination, risks to pilots in
screening and value of screening tests predicting future degeneration or disease.
OTA REPORT, supra note 168.
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nation's airline pilots with no medical evidence to support
action." 171 Lightfoot, backing the September 29-30, 1993
hearing, now anxiously awaits further Congressional discus-
sion of a change for the Age Sixty Rule. However, for now,
discussions concerning the rule have been suspended until
new technological battery tests are made available.
B. THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON AGING CHALLENGE
The National Institute on Aging (hereinafter NIA) also
found no medical justification for the rule.1 72 The NIA rec-
ommended to the FAA a program to allow pilots who are
fifty-five to volunteer for participation in a comprehensive
study where if they remained healthy, they could fly until
age sixty-five.1 73 To participate, these pilots would have to
agree to the risk of being retired before age sixty if the
study predicted that their health could compromise their
performance or the carrier's safety. 174 This plan, with its
ten-year age span, would help alleviate some of the arbitrary
blanket coverage of the randomly selected Age Sixty Rule.
When the FAA would not allow the study, the NIA agreed
with the Rule opposition that it is time to do away with this
arbitrary, non-scientific rule that is potentially harmful to
both the public and the airline industry.1 75
The OTA report required cognitive function neuropsychiatric tests given by
skilled, clinical psychologists. Id., n.59 at 10. But the OTA found that because the
majority of failures in pilot performance result from pilot error, not pilot impair-
ment or incapacitation due to medical illness, suggested screening improvements (a
battery of tests predicting the risk of developing medical illnesses) would have little
impact on accident rates. Id. Finally, the OTA study revealed that an estimated addi-
tional cost of $714 per pilot for individual screening tests and almost double that
amount for follow-up testing. Id. at 12. These costs do not, the OTA concluded,
include training, higher salaries for older pilots, labor contract re-bargaining, and
legal actions arising from the new screening processes. Id.
17, 311 AVIATION DAILY 341 (1993).
172 139 CONG. REc. E. 813, 814 (1993).
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C. THE DISCUSSION AT THE MOST RECENT HEARING
At the September 29, 1993, hearing, FAA Administrator
David R. Hinson alerted the flying community that the FAA
was open to a potential change in the rule as long as al-
lowing pilots over age sixty to fly did not compromise pas-
senger safety in any way. 176 Reasserting old challenges,
former pilots again maintained that they were being dis-
criminated against based on age while emphasizing that
their skills and experience offset any infirmities. 177 More-
over, these pilots acknowledged that other industrialized
nations allow pilots to fly commercially until sixty-five or
seventy, or beyond, and also emphasized the inconsistency
that the ban does not extend to pilots of small charter and
cargo planes or even the FAA's own pilots.' 78 In addition,
the pilots contend that economics and not passenger safety
is behind the rule.1 79
The FAA claims the rule is based on "medical principles,"
two of which are "indisputable."8 0 One pilot disputed this
FAA claim when he stressed that all commercial airline pi-
lots are grounded for physical and psychological testing
every six months for several days to determine the states of
their health and skills.' 8' During this time, decisions are
made individually on what, if any, modifications are needed
in training and scheduling for each aviator. 8 2 For pilots
under sixty, this process determines who flies and who does
not. Because pilots under sixty are tested on an individual
basis, the pilots argue that testing sixty-year old pilots indi-
vidually is not impossible either.183 This grounding process
could make the same determinations for pilots age sixty
176 U.S. Considers Lifting Ban on Older Pilots, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at A23
[hereinafter Lifting Ban], see also Arguments on FAA's Age 60 Rule Continue to Turn on
Medical Evidence, 313 AVIATION DAILY, 501 (1993) [hereinafter Arguments].
177 Id.
178 Lifting Ban, supra note 176.






and over at a lower economical cost. '84 Even if this individ-
ual testing for pilots age sixty and over is rejected outright,
it could be invaluable for collecting data for solving ques-
tions pertinent to the FAA's decision on its mandatory re-
tirement rule. 85 When this data is gathered, then an
informed decision "can be made based on fact, not on a
whim and a premise." 86
V. FUTURE PROJECTIONS FOR THE RULE AS IT
CURRENTLY READS
The Age Sixty Rule as it now reads creates various
problems in the future. The first of these is a projected
drop in the number of experienced pilots: Nearly one-third
of all U.S. pilots will be forced to retire over the next dec-
ade. 87 The longtime source of pilots - the military - is
training fewer pilots, thus requiring the airlines to rely on
the open market to fill the gaps. 188 Statistics show that
about 23,000 pilots will retire over the next ten years, and
another "4,500 new pilots could be needed each year when
184 Pilots Protest Mandatory Retirement at Age 60, LECAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 30,
1993, at 5.
185 Arguments, supra note 176. The data from individualized testing for pilots
under age 60 could be used to indicate areas of decline for pilots approaching age
60. If this testing were extended, the pilots argue, then it could also indicate areas
for pilots over age 60 at little additional cost as this data for pilots nearing age 60 is
already being gathered now. The data could be used to test the FAA's hypothesis
that incapacitation risks and unacceptable decrements in pilot performance in-
crease at accelerating rates with age. As pilots are already being tested as they ap-
proach age 60, then a mere extension of this testing to pilots over 60 could
document the areas of decline (or even catch individual risks) for little cost. At odds
with this argument is the FAA claim that medical science has no accurate tests to
identify aging pilots who are at risk for incapacitation or whose performance will
decline at an unacceptable level. However, the pilots find this argument flawed as
these very pilots are being tested at age 59 for performance level and there is no
medical principle showing that pilots age 60 as opposed to age 59 or 61 or 62 are not
able to be measured accurately. At the least, the pilots want the individualized test-
ing data for pilots approaching age 60 to be used to develop an accurate test. Id.
'8 On a Whim and a Premise, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 1, 1993, at A10.
187 Fred Bayles, Replacing Retiring Pilots Could Force Airlines into Hying Blind, L.A.
TIMES, June 20, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Replacing Pilots].
I" Id.
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the industry rises out of this current slump."1"9 The "mili-
tary[,] once the major supplier of experienced pilots[,] no
longer trains the numbers needed."190 Where once 85% of
airline crews learned to fly in the military, by the end of this
decade only one-third will have done so. 191 That huge
group of post-Korea and Vietnam-era pilots who joined the
commercial ranks in the 1960's as airlines expanded into
large jetliners is now approaching the mandatory retire-
ment age of sixty.1 92
The result of this pilot shortage will be a compromise in
pilot experience and training.193 Airlines are accepting pi-
lots meeting much lower standards "where a company used
to want [a newly hired pilot] to have 3,500 [hours] total time
and 500 hours jet time." '94 If the rule persists "as-is," pilots
will continue to resort to booking with pilot brokers to fly
with foreign airlines or these older pilots may fly for the rest
of their lives smaller planes carrying less than thirty passen-
gers; planes in which they work longer hours, and may
make more dangerous take-offs and landings than the aver-
age airline pilot.195
Another alternative to this training shortage will be a
movement from college aviation programs to individual
flight instruction programs.196 Many foreign airlines use
this approach by providing their own training, hiring peo-
ple with little or no flight experience to become pilots. Ja-
pan Air Lines (JAL) has been forced to accept this
approach because of little private aviation, limited air space,
and a small military supply from which to select pilots.1 97
189 Fred Bayles, Pilot Crunch Expected Within 3 to 5 Years, L. A. TIMES,June 20, 1993,
at A18.
190 Id.
191 Replacing Pilots, supra note 187.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Paul Proctor, et al., Airline Hiring Shrinks Supply of Well-Qualified Corporate Pilots,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 28, 1987, at 113 (quoting Aviation Personnel
International PresidentJanice K. Barden).
195 Id. see also Replacing Pilots, supra note 187, at Al.
196 Fred Bayles, Foreign Airlines Solve Their Pilot Shortage With Schools - In the U.S.,




Air France, Lufthansa and Iberia have also used this type of
training program for its pilots.19 These programs use an
"ab initio" approach, meaning "from the beginning." Po-
tential pilots undergo detailed physical and psychological
testing to determine if they meet the school's require-
ments.' 99 Those satisfying the rigorous qualifications are
then paid generously during the three and a half years of
schooling, an investment JAL makes to receive pilots
trained to specification and who will likely stay with the
company for thirty years or more.200 This standardized and
concentrated training closely parallels that which pilots un-
dergo in U.S. military programs. Upon graduation, JAL stu-
dents have 400 flight hours and are considered ready to
assume the second seat of a jumbo jet. While FAA regula-
tions require 235 flight hours for a commercial pilot's li-
cense, most U.S. airlines require pilots to have a few
thousand hours before flying their planes.0 1 With fewer
military pilots, the Age Sixty Mandatory Retirement Rule,
and the predicted shortage of commercial pilots, U.S. air-
lines may have to study the JAL pilot academy and recon-
sider their strict flight hour requirements.
A. NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS FOR A PROPOSED CHANGED
RULE
If the proponents of an age rule succeed and the age
sixty prohibition for pilots is extended, many adjustments
will be required.20 2 For many pilots, a change in this rule
may disrupt pension plans and lead to many complete rene-
gotiations; a change could hurt retirement reliance for pi-
lots who knew when they started that they would have to





202 Glenn Kessler, High Court Agrees to Clip Wings at 60, NEWSDAY, March 26, 1991,
at 390.
203 Morris, supra note 5, at 1.
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On the other side, the PPF stated that a change in the
rule will not harm pilots who have planned their careers
with the expectation of retiring at sixty.20 4 A change in the
rule would simply allow pilots the option to fly longer and
not force them to retire.2 °5 In rebuttal, ALPA replied by
stating that negotiations deal not only with airlines but with
government.20 6 These negotiated deals, concerning pen-
sion and retirement, are based on age sixty retirement.
However, if the rule were to be changed, the special provi-
sions, such as "full social security benefits starting at sixty,"
might be lost.2 07
B. FURTHER ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A RULE
CHANGE
Raising the age for mandatory retirement would add ben-
efits and greater expenses for airlines.2 0 8 For instance, a
carrier might receive more years of service from its pilots
before starting pension payouts to pilots.2 0 9 Medical plan
costs for carriers paying benefits to both active pilots and
retirees would be reduced as fewer people altogether would
receive coverage.210 In a rough balance, total wage costs
would rise, as senior pilots who receive more pay remain in
their positions longer.2 11 Also, less experienced pilots in
general would not gain promotions, but would instead
gather seniority, thus creating an older and more expensive
work force, one with more vacation time and substantially
more sick time. 12 Moreover, a rule change could disrupt









211 Reingold, supra note 10, at 184.
212 Id.
213 Id. Some airlines may have trouble charting retirement plans. Some offer
"pensions made up of 'defined benefit' only." A defined benefit formula is "based
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C. EXTRANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS OF THE RULE
Although many pilots over sixty possess the ability and
physical condition to continue flying, the Age Sixty Rule
should not be eliminated. At this particular point, medical
technology has not developed a battery of tests to predict
exactly when pilots should retire. Therefore, this blanket
age limit, while admittedly overinclusive, serves the public's
best interest by eliminating potentially dangerous pilots
whose age makes them more likely to experience incapaci-
tating trauma.
Understandably, the pilots who oppose the rule have ex-
cellent grounds for demanding more testing. With the
three-person pilot support crew in the cockpit, incapacitat-
ing trauma for one pilot might not affect the safety of pas-
sengers.214 However, this area needs further testing to
assure that first officers and flight engineers know and fol-
low emergency procedures. Because of the rule's existence,
emergency proceedings have been infrequent and few stud-
ies have been dedicated to the examination of in-flight
emergency procedure where a pilot experiences an inca-
pacitating trauma.
Pilots in opposition to the rule have offered a new battery
of tests.215 However, proponents of the rule find this a
flawed solution if put into effect immediately. These new
tests would expose currently flying pilots to continuous in-
trusion. Moreover, there is some fear that the flight simula-
tion testing might swell the industry ranks with "cocky [ten]-
on the final average earnings and years of service [which] determines the annual
payment during retirement...." Others use a "'defined contribution' .. . to fund
in pilot's name each year actively working minus the amount equal to a percentage
of the employee's annual earnings." Id. As a result, those with a defined benefit
plan could gain with an increase in the retirement age, as they would only pay those
retirees for fewer years. Whereas, those with a defined contribution plan would ex-
perience a rise in costs because their pilots would work more years at higher salaries,
which would lead to those employers paying increasing sums for each of those years.
Id.
214 The argument based on a three-person pilot support crew is weakened by the
fact that many cockpit crews now have only two.
215 See infra, note 231, for a complete discussion of the pilots' new test battery.
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year-olds skilled at Super Mario Brothers Nintendo. 216
Creating a test that serves as an accurate predictor of the
dangers of aging seems a monumental task. A test must ex-
ist that balances the acuity necessary to fly jumbo jets safely
and the maturity and responsibility necessary to assume
such a duty. At this time, the FAA has not perfected such a
test. Until it does, the rule should remain.
Pilots argue that they are being unfairly targeted by an
overinclusive age discrimination rule. However, the courts
have upheld similar rules as applied to government employ-
ees, such as police officers, fire fighters, and postal inspec-
tors.2 17  Again, the age cut-off may be arbitrary, but until
hard medical evidence identifies an appropriate cut-off, the
FAA should remain reluctant to move the age cut-off
upwards.
The rule should not be changed to apply retroactively.
Too many pilots rely economically on a retirement com-
plete with benefits beginning at age sixty. The retirement
age was known when these pilots began their careers and,
while extending the retirement age might economically
benefit these pilots, rethinking the rule will satisfy all their
initial expectations. Similarly, many of the rule's propo-
nents emphasize that airlines generously compensate pilots
for this early retirement throughout their active career in
salaries and benefits, and through carefully constructed
pension plans. In addition, by extending the rule's age cut-
off, many pilots who favor the early retirement plan may
experience additional testing, restructured pension agree-
ments, and career pressure to fly longer.
216 Steve Baker, 60-and-Out Has a Silver Lining, USA TODAY, July 26, 1989, at A6.
217 See, e.g., Patterson v. United States Postal Serv., 901 F.2d 927 (1lth Cir. 1990)
(upholding the Postal Service policy of refusing to appoint anyone older than 35 to
position of Postal Inspector as within the ADEA exception authorizing agencies to
set maximum limits for appointment as a law enforcement officer); EEOC v. Univer-
sity of Tex. Health Science Center, 710 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding maxi-
mum hiring age of 45 for campus police officers justified as BFOQ under ADEA);
Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1979) (upholding FAA's rule prohibiting
the use by commercial airlines of pilots older than 60).
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While these considerations discuss why an extension of
the mandatory retirement age for pilots might not be im-
mediately desirable or even available, there are too many
valid arguments as well as changing medical technology
and evidence showing that the Age Sixty Rule should un-
dergo drastic study. At present, the Age Sixty Rule seems
like the best alternative to insure passenger safety. How-
ever, those opposed to the rule have presented quite relia-
ble data showing that pilots approaching sixty possess
additional flight experience that may serve to counteract
any evidence the FAA might offer showing an increase in
accident rates for older pilots.
218
Older pilots have responded strongly to the argument
that they cannot compete in the modern technological
world of aviation. One American Airline pilot, fifty-four-
year-old Thomas S. Corboy, claims learning to fly new mod-
els "has something to do with individual pilot motivation,
but nothing to do with age."219 Corboy mastered his first
sophisticated autopilot type, the McDonnell Douglas MD-
80, at age forty-six, completing the course on time and with
no more difficulty than that faced by the younger pilots.
He attributes that accomplishment to a smarter industry.220
Corboy's point makes as much sense as any other made in
the thirty-year fight over a mandatory retirement age for pi-
lots. An industry concerned with the safety of its pilots
should assume the responsibility not for removing pilots ar-
bitrarily from the cockpit, but instead for creating tests and
training programs, maintaining in-flight supervision, and
conducting studies on the aging effect as it changes with
today's lifestyle. Therefore, while today a change in the
rule might create too great a risk for passenger safety and
airline liability, the FAA and the airline industry should
pour their money and energy into more studies, so that in
218 Armstrong, supra note 9; Aman, 856 F.2d at 949.
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the near future the FAA can extend the rule's age limit to
represent more fairly the actual conditions of its pilots.
VI. CONCLUSION: A PREDICTION OF THE AGE
SIXTY RULE'S STATUS IN THE FUTURE
Although proponents of an extension of the Age Sixty
Rule avidly presented their data and arguments at the Sep-
tember 30, 1993, hearing, the FAA has made no disclosure
on their decision concerning the rule. Instead, the FAA of-
ficials will sort through the thousands of pages of hearing
transcript and then make a decision on the rule's status.2 21
The FAA plans to evaluate the arguments of both sides with
an open mind to determine if the medical technology avail-
able today can safely assess and predict the effects of aging
on pilots. 222
According to Anthony Broderick, FAA Associate Adminis-
trator for Regulation and Certification, the FAA could de-
cide to preserve the current rule.223 However, if officials
decide to raise the age limit, a rulemaking proceeding
would be needed. 24 This rulemaking process would allow
for additional public comment.225
Presently, there is broad speculation concerning the like-
lihood that the United States, after its latest hearing, will
remain the only nation to practice this kind of age discrimi-
nation.2 6 At this point, it is argued that the FAA has the
ability to recertify pilots on an individual basis as shown by
the continuation to employ hundreds of victims of alcohol-
221 Telephone Interview with Dan Meier, Regulatory Branch Flight Standards
Services, Federal Aviation Administration, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 15, 1993); see
supra note 1.
222 Pilots Decry Age-60 Forced Retirement in Show of Zest, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at
A24.
223 Reingold, supra note 10, at 184.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 139 CONG. REC. E813-814. Italy went to 65. Japan went to 63. Only a few
remain below 60. The ICAO standard age is 60 for the pilot in charge and a recom-
mendation for the same rule for the next in charge.
In Europe, the JAA proposed that airlines allow one pilot per crew to fly until 65,
as long as the others are below 60. Reingold, supra note 10, at 184.
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ism, heart attacks, and strokes.227 However, the FAA seems
unwilling to repeal or extend this overinclusive law and is,
instead, exploring ways to replace the blanket retirement
rule with a test battery that would determine when each in-
dividual reaches the oldest "functional age" for that specific
individual.2 2 8 Both sides of this debate have been working
to find a suitable battery of tests. At the FAA's Civil Aero-
nautical Institute in Oklahoma City, several neurophysical
tests have been considered for this purpose.229
However, an immediate change is not likely as the fin-
ished product would not be available until early next dec-
ade. 230  Additionally, these proposed FAA tests and a
subsequent rule change can create new problems. One
such criticism is that new tests might identify numerous pi-
lots younger than sixty who should not be flying either.23'
The proponents for a rule change have taken yet another
approach by claiming that the FAA is overconcerned with
sudden incapacity. These pilots argue that if a reaction by a
pilot or auxiliary crew member takes one second rather
than 500 milliseconds to respond, there is no safety hazard
as almost nothing in an airplane cockpit requires that time-
232critical response. Responding as a neutral party, the Na-
tional Institutes of Health has also worked on a proposed
battery of tests. 233  Like the other tests proposed, this bat-
27 Serrill, supra note 13, at 45.
2 Reingold, supra note 10 at 184.
2- Id. In this project, pilot test subjects have performed a session flying a Boeing
727 simulator after taking the test battery to evaluate whether these tests are valid
predictors of flying performance. Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. Thus, the FAA's test alone offends ALPA and the pilots it represents who
fear overintrusive and overreaching testing and flying standards. Id.
232 Id. These pilots prefer a simple cardiovascular stress test which, they argue,
can determine with a high degree of probability who is likely to suffer a heart attack
in the near future. In addition, they advocate cockpit simulators and in-flight obser-
vation to test pilots' cognitive skills. Shari Roan, How Old is Too Old to Work?, L.A.
TIMEs, May 7, 1991, at El.
23 14 C.F.R. § 121 (1994). The NIH developed a comprehensive proficiency test
instead of a basic standard proficiency test. This comprehensive test includes:
i) collecting quantitative objective performance data under conditions
of stress and fatigue in a Line-Oriented-Flight-Training simulation
under conditions of fatigue;
3671994]
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tery also attracts criticism. Primarily, the criticism addresses
who will bear the costs of modifying the simulators and of
the needed additional staff, and who will fund for consul-
tants in both medical and operational areas in which the
FAA is not presently staffed to address adequately the re-
sults of such a comprehensive and special study program.24
Through the concerted efforts and studies of the FAA
and the Age Sixty Rule opponents, a suitable and effective
comprehensive testing battery will be developed. This com-
prehensive testing battery will lead to the change in the Age
Sixty Mandatory Retirement Rule.
However, with the development of such a battery and the
resulting extension, if not a total elimination of the
mandatory retirement age for pilots, several new concerns
will emerge. The foremost question is when the rule
change will take place. Presently, more than one-third of
U.S. pilots will reach sixty over the next decade, so pilots
desire a timely extension. 235 Among other questions: Who
will fund the tests enabling such a change in the rule? Who
will administrate, assess, develop, and manage the tests? At
what age will these tests be implemented? To what age
could retirement for pilots be safely extended? And finally,
will these intrusive tests detrimentally affect the job safety of
younger pilots whose skills may be questionable, but not be-
cause of age? Will a new law intrude with a new application
of an age limit to Part 135 crews or other pilots?
ii) assessing vigilance, handling of workload, and complex decision-
making situations; and
iii) evaluating ability to coordinate crew performance effectively and
the management of cockpit and ground support resources.
Id.
234 Id.
235 Foreign Airlines, supra note 196, at A20.
